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Abstract
We calculate the overall policy value of installed capacity additions and investment expen-
ditures in wind and solar energies in India. Recent increases in capacity additions and
investments by both the public and private sectors alongwith government support schemes
have made these energies more competitive with traditional fuels like coal in generating elec-
tricity. We use a two-factor learning curve to model the decline in prices of wind and solar
energies. Employing a real options approach with global coal prices as the stochastic variable
we nd the overall value of promotion policies in renewables to be suciently large. Reduc-
ing the share of coal in electricity generation is one of India's stated goals and a high trigger
price of coal suggests continued eorts of capacity additions and investment expenditures in
the solar and wind sectors are needed for some time in India.
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1 Introduction
India's Electricity Act of 2003 (the Act) came with provisions for introducing competition
in the power sector, protect consumer's interests and provide power for all citizens.1 The
Act which was further amended by the Electricity (Amendment) Act of 2007 had an impor-
tant feature of the mandatory establishment of State Electricity Regulatory Commissions
(SERCs) and the unbundling of the process of generation, transmission and distribution
of electricity ((Ministry of Power, 2018)). This allowed renewable energy based electricity
generation companies sell power to transmission and distribution utilities within a state and
in turn permit the distribution companies to meet their renewable purchase obligations.2
Section 63 of the Act also permits a state to select renewable energy producers through
tari-based competitive bidding which is intended to reduce the price of electricity faced
by consumers. This price for distribution and supply of electricity within a state is deter-
mined under the aegis of the respective SERCs.3 Overall, there has been a steady decline in
wind and solar taris in India and (Buckley and Sharda, 2015) estimate the solar levelized
cost of electricity (LCOE) in India to have fallen to Rs. 6:17/Kilowatt-hour (KWh) (US $
9:71c/KWh) from previous levels of Rs. 6:49/KWh (US $ 10:21c/KWh). There were bids of
solar taris as low as Rs. 2:44/KWh (US $ 3:84c/KWh) at the auction of 500 MW capacity
in the Bhadla Solar Park in Rajasthan ((Economic Times, 2018a)). For wind, (International
Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), 2015) estimate levelized costs for large-scale projects
to have fallen to US $ 8c/KWh and depending on power purchase agreements signed between
the generator and otaker such as a distribution utility, (CRISIL Ratings, 2018) estimate
wind taris to be around Rs. 3/KWh (US $ 4:72c/KWh) until 2019. (Bridge to India,
2017) nds 88% of investments in solar capacity is in form of utility-scale solar projects
1India, with a population of 1:27 billion had about 260 million or 21:3% of the population without access
to electricity until 2015 ((The World Bank, 2017)).
2The renewable purchase obligation targets were set to 8% for solar energy by 2019 and 15% for wind
energy by 2020 by the Government of India ((Buckley and Sharda, 2015)).
3(Qiu and Anadon, 2012) discuss competitive bidding for developing wind farms during the expansion of
China's wind energy industry from 2003 to 2007.
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undertaken by public and private investors, including domestic and international project
developers. The entry of large foreign project developers in both the solar and wind en-
ergy sectors in India has led to many joint ventures with various state governments in India
(see (Buckley and Sharda, 2015)) and the project developers have also been awarded power
purchase agreements due to their competitive bids.
The fall in solar and wind taris in India can be attributed to capacity additions and in-
vestment expenditures in renewable energies and government support schemes for wind and
solar. Some of these include the central (national) government oering subsidy up to 30%
of the system cost for solar rooftops for industrial and residential consumers and accelerated
depreciation benets up to 80% of depreciation in the rst year of installation of the project
and excise duty exemption and concession on import duties on components and equipment
required to set up large wind and solar power projects ((Government of Karnataka, 2010),
(Government of Andhra Pradesh, 2015a), (Bridge to India, 2016)). The Jawaharlal Nehru
National Solar Mission (JNNSM) was launched by the Government of India in 2010 with
an objective to make India a leader in solar power and an amount of Rs. 150:5 billion (US
$ 2:37 billion) was put forward by the central government as the total support for all ad-
ditions to solar capacities and rooftop solar in the rst phase of installation of the JNNSM
up to 2012-13 with a target of about 20 gigawatts (GW) ((Government of India, 2011),
(Government of India, 2016)). New investments in renewable energies in India increased
on average by 11% over 2004-17 and in 2017, developing countries invested US $ 177 bil-
lion in renewables which was more compared to that of US $ 103 billion by developed ones
((Bloomberg New Energy Finance, 2018)).4 We nd investments in solar and wind energy
sectors in India for 2017 totaled US $ 6:7 and 4 billion and US $ 5:5 and 3:8 billion for 2016
respectively. Furthermore, government and corporate research and development (R&D) in-
vestments for 2016 stood at US $ 10 million and 0:4 million respectively ((Bloomberg New
4Highest renewable energy investments for 2017 was China accounting for US $ 126:6 billion or 45% of
the world total.
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Energy Finance, 2017), (Bloomberg New Energy Finance, 2018)). Figure (1) shows India's
capacity additions in renewable energies over recent years.5 The installed generating capac-
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Figure 1: Installed Capacities of Selected Renewable Energy Sources (RES)
ity for solar increased from 2:12 MW in 2007-08 to 32:39 MW in 2010-11 to 6762:85 MW
in 2015-16 while capacity for wind has grown steadily to reach 26:8 GW for 2015-16. The
average growth in capacity addition over the years 2011-12 to 2014-15 for solar was 45:13%
while that for wind was 10:9%. The installed capacities for SHP (small hydro power  25
MW) and biomass/cogeneration were 4:3 GW and 4:8 GW respectively in 2015-16. Given
that majority of investment expenditures and cumulative capacity additions in renewable
energies are directed towards wind and solar, we concentrate on these energies for the rest
of our analysis.
2 Related Literature
In this work, we propose a real options model to study the value of promotion policies of
investment expenditures and additions to installed capacities for wind and solar energies in
India. We evaluate a model where a greater use of wind and solar in electricity generation
helps India to achieve its domestic targets and Paris Agreement goals as stated in Intended
5India's scal year ranges from April 1-March 31.
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Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC) targets submitted to the UN framework con-
vention on climate change. Specically, the domestic target includes installing capacities of
100 GW of solar, 60 GW of wind and 15 GW from other sources such as small hydro power,
biomass and urban and industrial waste by 2021-22 and reducing emission per unit of GDP
by 33-35% from 2005 levels and to produce 40% of electricity from non-fossil fuel sources
by the year 2030 as part of its Paris targets.6 Wind and solar energies can be especially
important in light of India's growing electricity demand due to growth in population, ur-
banization, transport demand and industrial production which would need an even greater
dependence on coal. India has traditionally relied on coal to generate the bulk of its elec-
tricity and the share of coal in electricity generation has been about three-quarters in recent
years ((Central Statistics Oce, 2015), (Central Statistics Oce, 2016)). Moreover, in view
of a rising coal import bill and pollution concerns, promotion of renewable energies through
decentralized and distributed generation and setting up microgrids on top of mobile phone
towers particularly for remote areas without access to the electricity grid and/or unstable
supply due to transmission and distribution losses is relevant for India having more than 10
million circuit kms of tranmission lines ((Buckley and Sharda, 2015)). (Chakravorty et al.,
2014) empirically analyze the eect of improved access of electricity for rural Indian house-
holds and conclude that connecting a rural household to the electricity grid (and with fewer
power outages) has a big positive impact on household income.7
Real options considers the exibility of the management or decision maker to make an
irreversible investment in a project depending on the arrival of future information ((Dixit and
Pindyck, 1994)). The option pricing theory of nance proposed by (Black and Scholes, 1973)
and (Merton, 1973) was used by (Myers, 1977) in context of real assets who stated that prots
6The Paris Agreement targets for India also constitute creating an additional carbon sink of 2:5 billion
tonnes of CO2 equivalent through extra forest and tree cover by 2030.
7India has one of the highest aggregate technical and commercial losses (transmission and distribution
losses and the additional energy that is lost because of theft and defective metering and errors in estimating
unmetered supplies) in the world ((Central Statistics Oce, 2015), (Dubey et al., 2014)). Small distributed
capacity investment for solar PV projects  1 MW in India has been constant at about US $ 1 billion over
2016 and 2017 ((Bloomberg New Energy Finance, 2017), (Bloomberg New Energy Finance, 2018)).
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created by cash ow generated from an investment arise from the use of currently owned
assets and the option of cash ows from future investment opportunities. Applications of
real options can be found in investments in wind energy and hydropower ((Venetsanos et al.,
2002), (Kjrland, 2007)) and valuing oil properties and oshore petroleum leases in (Paddock
et al., 1988). Real options therory rests on the situation that if a decision maker (or a social
planner in our context) has `x' years to make an investment in a project incurring a sunk
cost I, investing now or in the future depends on arrival of future information: we can wait
to invest until market conditions (prices, demand) improve. This additional value of waiting
gives the project a higher value than evaluating with a traditional Net Present Value (NPV)
approach where cash ows are discounted each period and the investment should be carried
out only when NPV> 0, otherwise not. The project value or options value arising from the
added managerial exibility in investment decisions using real options models has been called
\Expanded" or \Strategic" NPV by (Trigeorgis, 1993). Since the nature of future information
is uncertain, investment under a real options framework should be undertaken when the value
of waiting is zero.8 Here we calculate the benet of investments in wind and solar energies
using global coal prices as the stochastic variable. In context of a policy benet evaluation
model ((Siddiqui et al., 2007) and (Lee and Shih, 2010)), we model the falling prices of
wind and solar as a two-factor model ((Klaassen et al., 2005), (Rubin et al., 2015)) where
cumulative research expenditures and cumulative installed capacity additions in these sectors
are the drivers for cost reduction. We include energy investments in form of venture capital
and private equity investments, public and private R&D expenditures and small distributed
capacity investments in renewable energies in India.9 The rst contribution of the work
lies in nding the value of policies of additions to capacities and research expenditures for
solar and wind technologies in India; secondly, comparing the value of deploying additional
wind and solar with that of continuing with research expenditures and capacity additions
8However, in the absence of uncertainty and faced with a \now or never" decision to invest, traditional
NPV analysis gives the correct result.
9We include the sum of these investments as data for R&D expenditures are not available for all individual
years.
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to bring down their costs at each period, we also nd the `trigger price' where the value of
waiting is zero. The social planner should exercise the option of deployment of renewable
energies at the trigger price of coal. Trigger prices for every time period where the solution
changes from continuation to deployment gives interesting results. (Detert and Kotani,
2013) nd trigger prices for the case of Mongolia for making the investment for switching
to renewables in electricity generation assuming stochastic coal prices. We view this as the
second contribution of the paper as related works in the literature do not solve for the trigger
price when nding overall policy values of investment programs for renewables.
We clarify the problem of the social planner to invest in `additional' wind and solar energies
as the following. Our calculations show the share of wind and solar in electricity generation
to increase from around 5% in 2014-15 to a little above 12% in 2030 and that of coal to
drop to about 58%; we assume the shares of hydro and nuclear combined and that of natural
gas to remain constant at about 15% and 3% respectively.10 This implies that for India to
meet its Paris targets, the share of wind and solar would have to increase to about 25% and
we solve this problem in the context of their falling taris and stochastic global coal prices
using real options analysis. An an example, the state government of Karnataka announced
in 2010 the planned addition of 6600 MW of renewable energy capacities so as to increase
the current share of renewables from 11:5% to 20% in total electricity generation by 2015
((Government of Karnataka, 2010)).
The paper is organized as follows. We proceed with the model and framework and then with
the main results. We then move on to discussions and ideas for future research. The nal
section concludes.
10Although technically a fossil fuel, natural gas is the least polluting of all fossil fuel sources ((Hach and
Spinler, 2016)). Given capacity addition for nuclear and electricity generated from that sector has been very
negligible over recent years, we expect the small but constant share of gas in total electricity generated to
be important ((Central Electricity Authority, 2015)), ((Central Electricity Authority, 2017)).
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Table 1: Coal Price (US $) Summary Statistics and Dickey Fuller Test
Obs. 145
Mean 51.59
Std. Dev. 29.44
Min 24.45
Max 174.43
Augmented Dickey Fuller Test Results
t-statisticy -1.3493
p-value 0.6086
y Critical Values: 1% level = -3.5482; 5% level= -2.9126; 10% level= -2.594
3 Model
3.1 Stochastic Coal Prices
The stochastic variable in our model is international coal prices. (Bastian-Pinto et al., 2009)
state that the applicability of dierent stochastic processes to a particular type of problem
is a complicated issue. Proceeding with an augmented Dickey Fuller test to test whether
an unit root exists, while we may not be able to reject the null hypothesis of existence of a
unit root implying support for a Geometric Brownian Motion (GBM), for a short duration
time series, this does not necessarily rule out the possibility of mean reversion or Geometric
Mean Reversion (GMR). We use Quarterly data from 1980 to 2016 ((Federal Reserve Bank
of St. Louis, 2016)) for global price of coal per ton and since investment decisions in this
case can only be made at interval of a quarter and not in any moment, a discrete time
model is reasonable ((Boyarchenko and Levendorskii, 2007)). However, in context of India,
we use yearly estimates of the parameters of the model since we assume investment decisions
in additional energy capacity can only be made for every scal year. Data on investment
expenditures in clean energy in India are also available on a yearly basis ((Bloomberg New
Energy Finance, 2017), (Bloomberg New Energy Finance, 2018)). Summary statistics of the
data and results of the augmented Dickey Fuller test are presented in table (1). Results
from table (1) imply that the null hypothesis of a unit root cannot be rejected at signicance
levels of 10%, 5% or 1% and thus coal prices can be modeled as a GBM. However, we would
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also model global coal prices to follow a GMR since (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994) state that
while prices of raw commodities such as coal may uctuate randomly in the short run, they
are related to long term marginal production costs and would thus revert to a long term
average.
Coal prices following a stochastic price process of a GBM can be shown as
dPc = Pcdt+ Pcdz (1)
where Pc is the global price of coal,  and  are constants depicting the rates of drift and
variance and dz is a standard Wiener process dened as
dz = t
p
dt (2)
where t  N(0; 1). We approximate the above process by using a binomial lattice such
that the change in price through an upward movement is given by u = e
p
t, change in
price through a downward movement as d = 1=u, and the probabilities of an upward and
downward movement by p = e
t d
u d and 1  p respectively ((Hull, 2012)).11 We demonstrate
sample binomial trees for equations (1) and (7) in gures (2) and (3). The discretized version
for the GBM process given by equation (1) can be obtained by setting dt  t = 1 and
dPc  Pc;t+1   Pc;t
Pc;t+1 = Pc;t + Pc;t + Pc;tt (3)
Using Ito's Lemma, we know if coal prices follow GBM, then F (Pc) = lnPc follows a simple
Brownian motion as
dF =

  1
2
2

dt+ dz (4)
11Approximating the continuous process given in equation (1) with a binomial lattice in steps of t implies
discretizing the process. Since investment decisions can be made for every year, we assume t = 1 in our
case.
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Figure 2: Binomial tree for GBM
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or writing ln(Pc) = pc we get in discrete time
pc;t+1   pc;t =

  1
2
2

t+ t
p
t (5)
We use the maximum-likelihood estimates of  and . We will have  =  +
 
1
2

s2 and
 = s where  and s are the mean and the standard deviation respectively of pc;t   pc;t 1.
For our data, this gives yearly estimates  = 0:02958 and  = 0:20568.
If coal prices follow the stochastic price process of a GMR we have
dPc = ( Pc   Pc)Pcdt+ Pcdz (6)
where  is the speed of mean reversion, Pc is the long term mean to which Pc reverts,  is
the rate of variance and dz is dened by equation (2) as before. To be able to work with a
binomial lattice, we transform the above process to a simple mean reversion as ((Nelson and
10
Ramaswamy, 1990), (Bastian-Pinto et al., 2009))
dpc = ( pc   pc)dt+ dz (7)
where pc = ln(Pc) and pc is the long term mean to which pc reverts. We use the log of price
since it is commonly assumed that commodity prices are lognormally distributed and given
pc = ln(Pc), Pc cannot be negative. Following (Nelson and Ramaswamy, 1990) and (Bastian-
Pinto et al., 2010) to construct a recombining binomial tree for the process in equation (7)
given initial price pc0, we have for the upward movement pc
+, downward movement pc
 , up
probability p as
pc
+ = pc + 
p
t
pc
  = pc   
p
t
p = 1
2
+ ( pc pc)
2
p
t
(8)
such that the probability of a downward movement is given by 1  p as before. However, it
is clear from equation (8) that probability p can take values less than zero or greater than
1 under certain conditions. This is resolved by censoring the probabilities in the following
manner
p =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
1
2
+ ( pc pc)
2
p
t; if 0  p  1
0; if p < 0
1; otherwise.
(9)
For a recombinant binomial tree of simple mean reversion process in equation (7), the prob-
ability of an upward movement depends on the current value pc at that node. Moreover,
since successive values are obtained either by adding or subtracting the variance from the
previous node, which leads some nodes being very close to each other for smaller numbers
(see (Bastian-Pinto et al., 2009), (Bastian-Pinto et al., 2010)), the binomial tree would not
be as equally spaced as in gure (2) for a GBM process. Finally, the binomial recombinant
tree for the GMR process in equation (6) can be obtained by taking Pc = exp(pc) at each
11
Table 2: Geometric Mean Reversion-yearly estimates
Variable Coecient t-statisticy p-value
a 0.0238 1.386 0.1681
b -0.00032 -1.106 0.2706
S.E of regression 0.1022
Pc 74.378
 0.00032
 0.2044
y Critical Values: 1% level = -3.5482; 5% level= -2.9126; 10% level= -2.594
node. We need to write equation (6) in discrete time following equation (3) to be able to
estimate the parameters ,  and Pc. Setting dt  t = 1 and following (Dixit and Pindyck,
1994) and (Detert and Kotani, 2013) we run the regression
Pc;t   Pc;t 1
Pc;t 1
= a+ bPc;t 1 + et (10)
where a =  Pct, b =  t and et = t
p
t (taking the variance on both sides and using
t  N(0; 1), this implies =Standard Error of the regression). Estimates for GMR process
are given in table (2). We show the path for Quarterly data from 1980 to 2016 and sample
simulated paths for GBM and GMR in gure (4). The initial price in our data in 1980 was
US $ 40:26 per ton of coal. We however convert the gure to Rs./ton for our analysis given
other data for India. Increases in coal prices were seen during the early 1980's, 2008 and
2010-11 with the maximum value reached in the third quarter of 2008 at US$ 174:43. The
path for GBM shows the uctuating nature of global coal prices over time while that for
GMR demonstrates convergence towards a long term average.
3.2 Framework
We posit a log-linear relationship between reduction in cost per unit of wind and solar
technologies and (i) the cumulative installed capacity and (ii) cumulative investment expen-
ditures ((Klaassen et al., 2005), (Lee and Shih, 2010)). We combine the unit costs of solar
PV, solar rooftop, solar thermal and wind over the years and multiplying them with the cor-
12
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Figure 4: Coal Prices (US $/ton): Data and Simulated GBM and GMR Paths
responding shares of these technologies of the total installed capacities of renewable energies,
we arrive at an aggregate index of the unit cost of wind and solar. For cumulative installed
capacities and investment expenditures, we also consider an aggregate index combining the
gures for wind and solar. In this work, we measure unit cost as prices (taris) of electricity
in Rs./KWh, cumulative installed capacity in GW and cumulative investment expenditures
in billions of Rupees.12 We study the trend in wind and solar prices in India and not their
costs. However, with tari-based competitive bidding, we think that producers and project
developers do not have an incentive to oer bids too dierent from their levelized costs. We
have the equation
Ct = AX
 
t Y
 
t (11)
where Ct is unit cost of electricity from wind and solar, A is specic cost at unit cumu-
lative capacity and unit investment expenditure, Xt represents cumulative installed capac-
ity, Yt denotes cumulative investment expenditure and  and  are the learning-by-doing
and learning-by-searching indices respectively. The learning-by-doing and the learning-by-
searching rates are calculated as (1   2 ) and (1   2 ) respectively. They capture the
12(Klaassen et al., 2005) measure unit cost as investment costs (US $/KW) while (Siddiqui et al., 2007)
use cumulative energy produced (terawatt hours-TWh). For a meta-analysis of the literature on learning
curves or experience curves for electricity supply technologies and the various specications used, see (Rubin
et al., 2015).
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reduction in unit cost when cumulative installed capacity or cumulative investment expen-
diture is doubled. For example, if the learning-by-doing rate is 10%, it implies that when
cumulative installed capacity is doubled, the unit cost falls to 90% of the original cost, i.e. a
10% reduction. A similar explanation follows for the learning-by-searching rate.13 We report
the learning-by-doing and learning-by-searching indices and estimates of other parameters
used in our model in table (3). Taking the log of equation (11) we get14
lnCt = lnA  lnXt   lnYt (12)
where ln denotes the natural logarithm.
3.3 Policy Benet Evaluation Model
3.3.1 Basic Model
We construct a policy benet evaluation model to nd the overall policy value of India
producing 25% of its electricity from wind and solar by 2030. This is given the share of hydro
and nuclear and gas remain constant such that they meet the remainder of the 40% of non-
fossil fuel sources in India's Paris Agreement targets. We denote year 0 as 2014 and take 2030
as the terminal year (T = 16) and evaluate the option for the Indian government to invest in
additional wind and solar in any period between today and the end of the decision horizon.
Electricity demand is expected to grow in India because of rising industrial production and
transport demand ((Muneer et al., 2005)) and we assume net electricity demand growth to
be at 7% as in (Buckley and Sharda, 2015).15 Figure (5) explains the underlying problem.
13We calculate the learning-by-searching rate for wind and solar technologies as 7:3% and the learning-by-
doing rates for solar PV, solar rooftop and wind to be 9:4%, 8:2% and 7:4% respectively (see (Lee and Shih,
2010) and (Lin and Wesseh, 2013) for learning rates for Taiwan and China respectively). The learning-by-
doing rate for solar thermal technologies is zero due to negligible additions in solar thermal capacities which
has resulted in its tari being almost constant over recent years.
14We do not include an error term as in (Klaassen et al., 2005) and (Lee and Shih, 2010) for simplicity.
15Growing electricity demand for India also implies electricity generation from coal to increase in coming
years but its share in total electricity generation to decrease because of it being substituted by other sources.
The Indian government has goals to increase domestic coal production and there is the possibility of rising
14
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Figure 5: Wind and solar penetration through 2030
and solar if deployment is carried out in year 0 = 2014, year 1 = 2015, year 2 = 2016 and
so on. That is to say, if the social planner exercises the option to deploy in additional wind
and solar energies in 2014, its share in total electricity generated rises to 25% by 2030 from
the expected share of 12:72%. Consequently, if deployment is done later in 2015 or 2016,
the share of solar and wind reaches 24:23% and 23:46% respectively. Based on the binomial
lattices in gures (2) and (3), the value of the option of deployment is calculated using the
process of backward induction ((Dixit and Pindyck, 1994)). As in (Siddiqui et al., 2007), we
assume the price of wind and solar to be falling until the time of deployment. This may be
considered a limitation of the model. We start from the year 2030 assuming the option to
deploy additional wind and solar was not exercised before and the share of renewables is at
12:72%. Earlier deployment gives the benet of India reaching its Paris targets and enjoying
cost savings from reduced coal use and lower total externality costs. However, the solar and
wind price falls even further with later deployment but reaching domestic and international
targets are compromised. With global coal prices Pc;t (equations (1) and (6)) being our
stochastic variable, we denote W (k; i; r; j) the options value of deployment of additional
solar and wind in period k given the number of upward coal price movements i, number of
coal imports over coming years.
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research expenditures r  k and that deployment was undertaken in period j  k. The
policy value without deployment and with the option to deploy or continue with promotion
policies depending on respective expected future benets is given by V (k; i; r) with k, i, r
as before ((Siddiqui et al., 2007), (Lee and Shih, 2010)).
With deployment:
W (k; i; r; j) = [peqexc(j; k)l1   Ecqexc(j; k) + (pfit   cws(k; r))qews(j; k)] + Pc;t(k; i)Qc(k)
+ (pW (k + 1; i+ 1; r; j) + (1  p)W (k + 1; i; r; j))
(13)
Without deployment:
V (k; i; r) = max
8>><>>:
W (k; i; r; j);
 R +  (pV (k + 1; i+ 1; r + 1) + (1  p)V (k + 1; i; r + 1))
(14)
Equation (13) shows savings arising from greater deployment of wind and solar in addition to
the cost for using coal to generate electricity. pe and qews(j; k) denote the price of electricity
and the amount of electricity which is produced from wind and solar towards India meeting
its Paris targets. pfit is the combined average Feed-in-Tari (FIT) for wind and solar power
projects (we explain in detail in the next subsection).16 qexc(j; k) captures the extra amount
of electricity that is produced from coal and lignite: this variable takes the value 0 if Paris
targets are met (or wind and solar share equals 25% in gure 5) to a maximum of 12:28%
if additional wind and solar energies are not deployed. Similarly, Qc(k) is the extra amount
of coal needed to produce the additional electricity from coal and lignite.17 The capacity
utilization factor of coal is captured by l1 and total externality cost from coal-red plants used
for power generation is denoted by Ecqexc(j; k) where Ec is the per unit externality cost ((Cost
16We assume pe to be constant. Data from (Power Finance Corporation, 2015). We attribute the price of
electricity as that for electricity for coal and lignite red power plants due to lack of ocial data specically
for electricity price paid to these plants. Although far from complete, there is ocial data for some states
for FITs.
17Qc(k) also takes on a value of 0 if share of wind and solar equals 25%. Qc(k) is calculated using the
average amount of coal needed to generate a GWh of electricity.
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Assessment of Sustainable Energy Systems, 2008)).18 Our variable of interest is the price
of wind and solar energies cws(k; r) which is falling with both increasing installed capacity
over time and increasing research expenditures. The net cost of support of additional wind
and solar energies is thus given by the dierence of pfit and cws(k; r) which is increasing.
W (k; i; r; j) depends on its value one period after discounted using the rate of discount  and
up and down probabilities dened as p and 1  p respectively (varying p and 1  p for mean
reversion). Given equation (13), equation (14) is also calculated backwards beginning at T
such that the value of future promotion policies is the maximum of the value of deployment
and spending a xed cost of R. We can solve for values of previous periods given the value
for one period after and comparing with the option to deploy. The value function V (k; i; r)
thus compares the expected benets from deployment or continuation for the social planner.
After computing all of W (k; i; r; j), we then get the overall real options value for time 0 as
V (0; 0; 0) = max
8>><>>:
W (0; 0; 0; 0);
 R +  (pV (1; 1; 1) + (1  p)V (1; 0; 1))
(15)
where V (0; 0; 0) is the policy value at year 0 of India meeting its Paris Agreement targets.
3.3.2 Introducing Cost of Support
We introduce cost of support of additional wind and solar technologies in form of FIT which
means a minimum guaranteed price per unit of electricity paid to grid-connected renewable
energy projects and solar rooftops. While grid-connected projects of usually 1 MW and
above are those connected to the network of the distribution or transmission utilities to
sell electricity directly to the grid, incentives such as FIT and a separate Generation Based
Incentive (GBI) are also available for solar and wind power producers (not grid-connected)
for sale of power to a public or private distribution licensees within a state ((Government
18The other way of measuring externality could be from CO2 emissions from fuel combustion from elec-
tricity and heat production (from using coal). See (International Energy Agency, 2016). The problem is
that data on price of CO2/ton for India is hardly available.
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of West Bengal, 2012), (Government of Tamil Nadu, 2012), (Government of Gujarat, 2009),
(Government of Gujarat, 2013)).19 While the benet of FIT is oered by respective states
and is administered by State Electricity and Regulatory Commissions (SERCs) for each
state, GBI is an incentive (much smaller in proportion to FIT) which is oered by the
central government and if applicable, is over and above the benet of FIT. In this work,
we consider the total cost of support of benets of FIT and GBI borne by the central and
state governments and its eect on the time of deployment of additional wind and solar
technologies in view of India's national and international targets. India also plans to invest
US $ 50 billion in order to upgrade its transmission and distribution grid and implement
a net metering program which allows solar rooftops to feed surplus power to the grid and
obtain FIT benets ((Buckley and Sharda, 2015)). We arrive at a gure of Rs. 6:439/KWh
(US $ 10:13c/KWh) as the combined average FIT for wind and solar power projects.
4 Results
4.1 Policy Value
The overall policy values or V at time 0 from equation (15) for GBM and GMR are shown
in table (4). The drift and uncertainty associated with GBM implies a higher overall policy
value at Rs. 24; 029 billion compared to Rs. 19; 116 billion if coal prices evolve according
to GMR. The value of existing wind and solar technologies is computed supposing that
cws(k; r) is constant over time and that additional wind and solar is deployed whenever its
cost falls below that of the stochastic coal price. It is interesting to note that even in absence
of future promotion policies of investment expenditures and capacity additions, stochastic
19In cases when a solar or wind power producer (not grid-connected) sells power to a state or private
distribution licensee, the rates of purchase either pertain to ocially determined rates or mutually agreed
rates between the producer and the distribution licensee. Power purchase agreements may extend up to 25
years in this case and the wind or solar power developer pays for the entire cost of construction and power
evacuation facilities and the acquisition of land up to the interconnection point with the distribution licensee
substation ((Government of Andhra Pradesh, 2015a), (Government of Andhra Pradesh, 2015b)).
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world coal prices give existing wind and solar technologies a suciently high value of Rs.
10; 343 and Rs. 6; 110:4 billion respectively.This can be contrasted to losses for state utilities
selling electricity directly to consumers (state utilities source majority of their power from
coal red power plants and have limited renewable purchase obligation targets) which were
Rs. 637:65 Billion in 2013-14 ((Power Finance Corporation, 2015)). We nd the value of
future promotion policies as the dierence between the overall real options value and the
value of existing wind and solar: for similar reason of drift and uncertainty in case of GBM,
value of future promotion policies is also higher compared to that for GMR.
4.2 Trigger Price and Cumulative Cost of Deployment
We compute the `trigger' price of coal which triggers deployment of additional wind and
solar technologies today. (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994) explain this price to be that when the
value of the option at the end of the decision horizon equals the value of the option today or
the value of waiting falls to zero. (Detert and Kotani, 2013) nd trigger prices for Mongolia
switching to renewable energies in its electricity generation mix from traditional use of coal
and diesel. Using the policy benet evaluation model from above we nd the trigger price
of coal where the social planner nds the value of deployment of additional wind and solar
to be higher than that of continuing with cumulative capacity additions and cumulative
investment expenditures. We show the trigger prices in tables (5) and (6).
We introduce the concept of cumulative cost of deployment which is the sum of the net
cost of support times the electricity generated from wind and solar energies towards India
meeting its domestic and international targets, i.e.
P
(pfit   cws(k; r))qews(j; k). The net
cost of support rises over time the longer the social planner waits to exercise deployment
but additional electricity produced from wind and solar also takes a lower trajectory until
the end of the decision horizon as shown in gure (5). However, the eect of paying support
for a longer time dominates and we nd the cumulative cost of support to increase. This
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is a dierence from the work of (Lee and Shih, 2010) and (Lin and Wesseh, 2013) who
consider maximizing the overall policy value of the renewable energy investment program
adjusting the FIT rate. In increasing the FIT rate slowly from that which is xed by the
government (of Taiwan and China respectively), the papers nd the optimum FIT which
should be xed by the government.20 In case of India, the FITs for wind and solar energies
are actually falling and GBIs especially for wind have been put a halt. This has resulted in
a small decline in number of projects commissioned and power purchase agreements signed
((Economic Times, 2017), (Economic Times, 2018a), (Economic Times, 2018b)). We think
one of the reasons for fall in FITs in India is a decline in levelized costs for wind and solar
which supposedly need less support from the government. But solar installations (installed
wind capacity far exceeds that of solar with signicantly less capacity targets by 2021-22)
have not been as fast for India to meet its domestic targets and the solar rooftop sector is
not very developed.21. We propose that the cumulative cost of deployment has an important
eect on the timing of deployment of additional wind and solar because it puts an additional
strain on the resources of a relatively poor economy. In addition, widespread deployment of
solar electricity in the long run would aect industries such as consumer electronics (whose
demand is expected to rise as the economy grows) which competes with solar for use of
scarce minerals, e.g. semiconducting materials like indium which is used for manufacturing
of liquid crystal displays ((Steinbuks et al., 2017)). We modify equation (14) to include the
cumulative cost of deployment as
V (k; i; r) = max
8>><>>:
W (k; i; r; j) D(k; i; r; j);
 R +  (pV (k + 1; i+ 1; r + 1) + (1  p)V (k + 1; i; r + 1))
(16)
where D(k; i; r; j) denotes the cumulative cost of deployment with k, i, r, j as before. Table
(3) shows the rising values of the cumulative cost of deployment. The overall real options
20(Lee and Shih, 2010) maximize the ratio of the overall policy value of the renewable energy development
program to that of cumulative research expenditures.
21See (Bridge to India, 2016), (Bridge to India, 2017) for comparison of solar capacity installations in India
and in other countries.
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value is similarly modied as in equation (15). Results as in table (4) would be to reduce the
overall policy value and values of existing wind and solar and of future policies: we however
report the more interesting case of the eect of D on the trigger price. Table (5) reveals the
trigger price which forces the social planner to deploy additional wind and solar technologies
today at t = 0 does not exist for GBM and that it is very high for the case of GMR at Rs.
83; 532 (US $ 1; 314:2) per ton of coal. So, the policy of continuing with future additions
to wind and solar capacities and research expenditures is undertaken today for the case of
GBM and eectively for all coal prices for GMR by the social planner until the option to
deploy is exercised when coal prices reach a very high level. We however nd that the option
to deploy would be exercised for t = 1 to t = 16 (the end of the decision horizon or T )
for all prices for both GBM and GMR. We note the lowest price in our data as Rs. 177:8
(US $ 2:8) per ton of coal for GBM and Rs. 181:4 (US $ 2:9) for GMR as trigger prices
for these cases. Results are qualitatively similar until t = 9 when the cumulative cost of
deployment is included in table (6): the social planner chooses to continue today instead of
deployment for GBM and exercises deployment in case of GMR at a very high price per ton
of coal. So, in the best scenario, from gure 5, we conclude that the share of wind and solar
in the electricity generation mix would reach 24:23% which is not very far from India's Paris
Agreement targets. Intuitively given the policy to continue with promotion policies today,
deploying additional renewable energies at even very low global coal prices tomorrow and the
day after is justied as the price of wind and solar keeps falling until the time of deployment.
We report trigger prices from t = 10 onwards which are lower (except for t = 16) for GBM
in contrast to GMR because of higher uncertainty associated with GBM in place of prices
converging towards a long term average. If deployment is exercised at t = 10, the share of
wind and solar reaches 18:09% by 2030. We show a threshold curve or a \free boundary"
((Dixit and Pindyck, 1994)) in gure (7) such that for each period, if coal prices are above the
boundary, the option to deploy is exercised{otherwise the social planner chooses to continue
with future policies. The free boundary is non-decreasing since approaching the end of the
21
Coal Prices (Rs./ton)
2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000 14000 16000 18000
O
pt
io
ns
 V
al
ue
 (R
s. 
bil
lio
n)
-4000
-3500
-3000
-2500
-2000
-1500
-1000
-500
t=10
t=11
t=12
t=13
(a) GBM
Coal Prices (Rs./ton) ×104
0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5
O
pt
io
ns
 V
al
ue
 (R
s. 
bil
lio
n)
-4000
-3500
-3000
-2500
-2000
-1500
-1000
-500
t=10
t=11
t=12
t=13
(b) GMR
Figure 6: Value functions for GBM and GMR with cost of deployment
decision horizon entails the social planner would wait longer and for a higher global coal
price before exercising the option to deploy additional wind and solar energies. The trigger
price increases from Rs. 2; 586:6 (US $ 40:7) for t = 10 to Rs. 102; 480 (US $ 1; 612:3) per
ton of coal for GMR and from Rs. 1; 390:3 (US $ 21:9) for t = 10 to Rs. 104; 460 (US $
1; 643:4) per ton of coal for GBM. As an example, we show the value functions for cases of
GBM and GMR in gure (6). The overall value of additional wind and solar energies rises
with coal prices given the possibility of coal becoming costlier in future and a rising cost of
pollution. The points of kink depict the trigger prices such that the option value keeps rising
after deployment for periods t = 10 to t = 13 considered in the gure. Intuitively, the free
boundaries in gure (7) are obtained by connecting the points of kink in gure (6). Given a
very high trigger price today for GMR, it is shown as a separate box in the top-right corner
inside gure (7)(b). We see for t = 10 for GBM, the option to deploy would be exercised for
a price of coal greater or equal to Rs. 1; 390:3 per ton while the trigger price for t = 14 is
Rs. 24; 755 per ton of coal. Similarly, we observe trigger prices for various periods for the
case of GMR.
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Figure 7: Free boundaries for GBM and GMR with cost of deployment
5 Discussion
We nd the overall value of additions to solar and wind energies in context of India's am-
bitious domestic targets and its Paris Agreement goals using a real options approach. The
work is interesting given installed capacities for both wind and solar energies have risen
rapidly as seen in gure 1 and new investments in wind and solar energies (as a total of
venture capital and private equity investments, public and private R&D expenditures and
small distributed capacity investments) have also increased from Rs. 156 billion to Rs. 572
billion between 2004 to 2015 ((Bloomberg New Energy Finance, 2017), (Bloomberg New
Energy Finance, 2018)). In addition, solar and wind taris have been falling in India as
shown by power purchase agreements oered to wind and solar project developers because
of their competitive bids. We proceed with our analysis using coal prices as the stochastic
variable ((Detert and Kotani, 2013)) and using a two-factor model of (Klaassen et al., 2005)
to model the decline in prices of wind and solar.
Future work could consider the eects of scale economies and input prices for India as part
of the learning curve model. While there have been studies regarding the eect of size of
the wind farm and its input costs for China ((Qiu and Anadon, 2012)), detailed information
on the number of wind farms and their respective sizes for India is not available. The other
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issue is that research could overstate the eect of scale economies for wind energies given
lower eciency factors and capital costs in India in comparison to other parts of the world.
(Buckley and Sharda, 2015) report capital costs for wind at US $ 1 million for 1 MW of
capacity because of older and less ecient technologies with the capacity utilization factor
at 25%. On the other hand, with a global average installation cost of wind between US $ 1:5-
2 million per MW of capacity, eciency factors range from 30-35% for the US and Australia
and upwards of 40% for some sites in Brazil and New Zealand.22 With India planning to build
taller wind turbines, the eciency factor would increase however dampening the reduction
in wind prices for consumers (see footnote 9). We do not include the eect of domestic
module manufacturing on solar prices in India since most of the module manufacturing
capacity is obsolete and uncompetitive and module prices from China, the largest source
of module imports at over 80%, also increased over 2017 because of higher import duties
and other reasons ((Bridge to India, 2017), (Economic Times, 2018a)). One possible avenue
for extension could be to include the investment in solar parks by large developers where
the land for the park and basic acess roads are built by the government but the developer
bears all expenses for building the connection line until the distribution licensee or otaker
substation which in turn sells power to consumers ((Government of West Bengal, 2012)).
There also exists a signicant number of central and state schemes oering nancial support
for building solar parks ((Government of Karnataka, 2014), (Bridge to India, 2017)). Some
other ideas could be to analyze the eect of scarcity of water in the drier states of India of
Gujarat and Rajasthan with a signicant number of solar installations: the cost of cleaning
and maintaining solar panels is higher for these states and it would be interesting to see
whether incomes increase due to greater access to electricity or if the cost of diverting water
from essential domestic and agricultural uses to maintaining solar panels is high enough. The
eect of the increasing operating eciency of coal-red power plants due to restructuring of
the electricity sector in India as proposed in the Act (Malik, 2012) and a greater use of nuclear
22Capacity utilization factors are even higher for o-shore wind farms ((International Renewable Energy
Agency (IRENA), 2015)). India does not have any such wind farm yet.
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power in India could help the country achieve Paris targets without huge investments in wind
and solar energies while reducing coal imports. Finally, the eect of subsidized electricity
prices is out of the scope for the current version of the paper. Electricity prices are highly
subsidized in India especially for agricultural consumers and taking this into account would
only increase the electricity price which we expect would alter the trigger price downwards.
6 Conclusions
The question addressed in this work is if India can meet its ambitious domestic targets and
Paris Agreement goals. Domestic targets, by the year 2021-22, for capacity installations
in wind and solar energies were scaled up from 50 GW to 60 GW and 20 GW to 100
GW respectively. This was part of the Budget 2015 targets announced by the current
government. As part of India's Paris climate agreement targets in 2015, it plans to produce
40% of its electricity from non-fossil fuel sources and reduce its emission per unit of GDP
by 33-35% from 2005 levels by the year 2030. We assume global coal prices following the
processes of GBM and GMR and conclude that wind and solar technologies could help India
reach its targets to a large extent if promotion policies of capacity additions and investment
expenditures are undertaken for some time. Cumulative capacity additions and cumulative
investment expenditures help reduce prices of wind and solar energies which gives a high real
options value for these promotion policies. We include support schemes such as FIT and
GBI from the central and state governments and the planner solution remains unchanged.
In addition, solving for trigger prices of when additional wind and solar energies would be
deployed for cases of GBM and GMR, the trigger price is found to be non-decreasing as we
approach the end of the decision horizon. Trigger prices in general are also higher for GBM in
contrast to GMR because of the drift and uncertainty associated with the process. However,
our solution shows that the social planner should only exercise the option to deploy wind
and solar after some time periods given promotion policies of investments in these energies
25
have been able to reduce their prices eectively.
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Table 3: Baseline Parameters
Parameters Values Estimation
pe (Rs./KWh) 4:37 Average of electricity prices for all regions
and states across ve regional grids as reported by
SERCs ((Power Finance Corporation, 2015)).
qexc (GWh)
Calculations using data from (Central Statistics Of-
ce, 2015),
t = 0,..,16 0; ::416; 010 (Central Statistics Oce, 2016).
l1 0.655 (Central Electricity Authority, 2015).
Ec (Rs./KWh) 4:22
(Cost Assessment of Sustainable Energy Systems,
2008).
cws(0; 0)
(Rs./KWh)
5:62
Data for capacity additions and taris and ca-
pacity utilization factors for wind and solar ener-
gies obtained from government sources and (Buck-
ley and Sharda, 2015) and (Bridge to India, 2016),
(Bridge to India, 2017) and (Shrimali et al., 2015).
Data for investment expenditures in renewable en-
ergies from (Bloomberg New Energy Finance, 2017),
(Bloomberg New Energy Finance, 2018). Using tech-
niques in (Klaassen et al., 2005), we compute the
learning indices (, ) and obtain the price of wind
and solar at time 0.
A (Rs./KWh) 7:25 Same as to compute cws(0; 0).
 0:115 Same as to compute cws(0; 0).
 0:109 Same as to compute cws(0; 0).
qexws (GWh)
Calculations using data from (Central Statistics Of-
ce, 2015), (Central Statistics Oce, 2016) with es-
timated capacity additions and
t = 0,..16 430; 710; :; 846; 720 capacity utilization factors as obtained for cws(0; 0).
Pc;t(0; 0) (Rs./ton) 4; 775:9 (Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 2016).
Qc(k) (Million
Tons), t = 0; ::16,
0; ::178:88
Average amount of coal needed for a GWh of electric-
ity calculated from (Ministry of Coal, 2015), (Cen-
tral Statistics Oce, 2015), (Central Statistics Of-
ce, 2016).
pfit (Rs./KWh) 6:439 Various state government sources. See text.
D (Rs. billion)
t = 0,..16 696:89; :; 23; 434:15
Obtained from state government sources as for the
average combined FIT.
R (Rs. billion) 592:62
(Bloomberg New Energy Finance, 2017),
(Bloomberg New Energy Finance, 2018).
T (years) 16
t (years) 1
 0:975 (Detert and Kotani, 2013).
1 GWh= 106 KWh
Exchange Rate: 1 $ US =Rs. 63.56, 1 Euro=Rs. 70.55 ((Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 2016))
Table 4: Overall real options value (Rs. billion)
Total Value Value of existing Value of future
wind & solar policies
GBM 24; 029 10; 343 13; 686
GMR 19; 116 6; 110:4 13; 005:6
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Table 5: Trigger prices Rs./ton
t = 0
GBM t = 0 continue
t = 1::::t = 16(= T ) deploy 177:8
GMR 83; 532 {
t = 1::::t = 16(= T ) deploy 181:4
Table 6: Trigger prices with cost of deployment Rs./ton
t = 0 t = 10 t = 11 t = 12 t = 13 t = 14 t = 15 t = 16(= T )
GBM { 1; 390:3 4; 775:9 8; 851:7 16; 406 24; 755 45; 881 104; 460
t = 0 continue
t = 1; 2; 3
t = 4; 5; 6
t = 7; 8; 9 deploy 177:8
GMR 83; 532 2; 586:6 7; 187:8 13; 271 19; 973 30; 060 55; 502 102; 480
t = 1; 2; 3
t = 4; 5; 6
t = 7; 8; 9 deploy 181:4
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